In addition, Sam David Harris Jr., 38, of Middleburg, must serve a lifetime of supervised release. The court also ordered Harris to pay $65,500 in restitution to the victims of his offenses. Harris pleaded guilty on Sept. 21, 2023.

Eric Lavon Williams, 36, of Pima, pleaded guilty to one count of knowing access of child pornography on July 12, 2023. When Williams is released from prison, he will be on supervised release for the remainder of his life and will be required to register as a sex offender.

Sergio Maximiliano Martinez of Portland, Oregon, became the second person to plead guilty in federal court March 12 to drug trafficking and obstruction of justice charges in a case that began last spring, when Martinez’s then-girlfriend Victoria Carmona was caught trying to smuggle over 40 pounds of cocaine into the United States in her car.

What GAO Found Managed care plans have some flexibility in determining when to authorize services for enrollees. Managed care enrollees may appeal denials of requested services and file grievances about any dissatisfaction not covered by an appeal. Data on appeals and grievances are an important tool for oversight of managed care, as they can help reveal quality and access issues. The first year of data from state annual managed care reports indicated that rates of appeals and grievances per 1,000 enrollees varied widely across states in 2022. Among other things, this could signal problems with access to needed services. Medicaid Managed Care Plan Appeal Rates Across States with Reliable Appeals Data, Contract Year 2022 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has begun taking steps to address limitations in the new appeals and grievances data. For example, as of December 2023, CMS had conducted technical assistance with seven states to address data gaps and inconsistencies. CMS has also outlined its intentions to use these data for oversight and to enhance transparency. However, GAO found: No data on outcomes or number of denials. CMS does not require states to report on the outcomes of enrollee appeals (e.g., whether a plan overturns its initial denial upon review) or the number of denials. These data elements are key to identifying potential problems with enrollee access to services. Delayed progress on planned actions to use the data. As of December 2023, CMS had made limited progress on its plans to analyze the data and make data available to the public. Taking these steps would help to inform CMS's data quality efforts and provide incentives for states to focus on quality. By requiring states to report additional data and implementing planned steps to use the data, CMS would be better positioned to meet its goal to use the data to target program improvement, including around enrollee access to care. Why GAO Did This Study Over 70 percent of Medicaid enrollees receive services through managed care. Because there can be financial incentives for managed care plans to deny or limit services, appeal and grievance systems serve as a safeguard to protect enrollees. States are required to use appeals and grievances data to monitor managed care plans' performance. Beginning in 2022, states were also required to report certain managed care plan appeals and grievance data and other information to CMS annually. GAO was asked to examine the new appeals and grievances data. This report (1) describes what the first-year data indicate about appeals and grievances, and (2) examines CMS's efforts to address any limitations in the data and its efforts to use the data for oversight. GAO analyzed appeals and grievances data for state contract year 2022 across 35 states, and interviewed officials from five of these states, selected on the basis of geography and other factors. GAO also reviewed CMS documents, interviewed CMS officials, and assessed CMS's efforts against agency guidance.

What GAO Found GAO's ongoing and prior work identified challenges that federal agencies face: Wildfire response and recovery. GAO has previously reported that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) faces challenges in assisting state, local, and tribal governments after wildfire events. For example, securing temporary housing for survivors is difficult because disasters exacerbate pre-disaster shortages of affordable housing. Further, wildfires generally destroy entire structures and leave contaminated debris and soil that require lengthy clean-up before property is safe for habitation. FEMA is taking steps to address these post-disaster housing challenges and GAO will continue to assess these efforts in its ongoing work. Residential Wildfire Debris, Lahaina, Hawaii, September 2023 Recruitment and retention of wildland firefighters. GAO's prior work identified barriers to the recruitment and retention of federal wildland firefighters, including low pay and opportunities for career advancement. Congress has authorized pay increases through fiscal year 2026, but longer-term solutions are needed, according to agency officials. Interagency coordination. GAO's prior work identified opportunities for improved interagency coordination in managing risks from wildfire smoke and in federal disaster recovery efforts. In March 2023, GAO made recommendations to help strengthen federal coordination between the Environmental Protection Agency and land management agencies in reducing risks to air quality and public health from wildfire smoke. As of March 2024, four of the six recommendations were partially addressed. Additionally, in November 2022, GAO reported that the federal approach to disaster recovery is fragmented across more than 30 federal agencies and departments and at least 32 congressional committees. GAO recommended that agencies identify and take steps to better manage this fragmentation and that Congress consider establishing an independent commission to recommend reforms to the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. As of March 2024, a commission has not been established. Why GAO Did This Study In recent decades, the nation has witnessed an increase in the size and severity of wildfires as well as longer wildfire seasons. Demand for federal resources to prepare for, respond to, or recover from these wildfires is expected to increase. This testimony discusses GAO's ongoing and prior work and recommendations on challenges related to (1) wildfire response and recovery, (2) recruitment and retention of wildland firefighters, and (3) interagency coordination. This statement is based on GAO's ongoing work on FEMA's wildfire prevention and recovery efforts and prior reports, published from November 2022 through March 2023. For its ongoing work, GAO reviewed relevant FEMA policies, procedures, and guidance related to wildfires; conducted a site visit to Hawaii to observe response and recovery efforts; and interviewed relevant FEMA officials. Details about the scope and methodology for published GAO reports are included in those products.

Audit: DOE-OIG-24-13

What GAO Found The length of time between when an agency solicits offers from potential contractors and the date it awards a contract is known as the procurement administrative lead time (PALT). GAO found that median award lead times, or PALT, generally decreased from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2022 for Department of Defense (DOD) contracts and orders valued above $250,000. This suggests that DOD has realized some contracting efficiencies since 2018 when it began collecting data to measure PALT. However, PALT varied by characteristics such as total contract value, contracting approach, contract type, extent of competition, and the type of product or service procured. For example, median PALT values increased by 70 days over the four-year period GAO reviewed for DOD contracts and orders valued over $50 million. Change in DOD-wide Median Procurement Administrative Lead Time for All DOD Contracts and Orders Above and Below $50 Million in Value, Fiscal Years 2019–2022 After its adoption of the current PALT definition, DOD updated guidance to encourage the use of practices intended to reduce award lead times. For example, DOD reissued its Source Selection Procedures memorandum in August 2022, adding streamlining techniques for procurement officials to consider. These techniques generally reflect practices to reduce PALT that were suggested in a January 2021 Office of Management and Budget memorandum. While updating guidance is a positive step, DOD does not have insight into PALT at the department-wide level, in part for the following reasons: DOD officials do not regularly monitor PALT on a department-wide basis, such as by reviewing PALT data maintained by the defense components or discussing PALT changes with the components. A DOD tool, the PALT Tracker, implemented in February 2019 for the detailed tracking of PALT for procurements over $250 million in value, has data gaps, which limits its usefulness as a monitoring tool. Components reported that it is burdensome and duplicative of other systems they use. DOD would benefit from engaging with the components to determine how existing procurement data can be leveraged to enhance DOD's visibility into PALT changes and whether the PALT Tracker is still needed. If the PALT Tracker remains necessary to supplement existing procurement data, then improvements are needed to ensure its data are complete. Why GAO Did This Study DOD uses contracts to procure goods and services ranging from cutting-edge military aircraft to common office supplies. DOD leadership and contractors have expressed concern about the length of time it takes to award contracts, which includes PALT. DOD began collecting data to measure PALT in June 2018 for contracts and orders valued above $250,000. A committee report included a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts to address PALT. This report assesses changes in PALT over a four-year period and the extent of efforts—both DOD-wide and by selected DOD components—to manage and monitor the length of time it takes to award contracts. GAO selected the four DOD components (Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency) with the most contracting activity from fiscal years 2019 through 2022 and analyzed data on PALT. GAO also reviewed relevant DOD guidance and memorandums, and interviewed officials at DOD and the selected components.

What GAO Found Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is an emerging concept of air transportation that will leverage new types of aircraft and innovative technologies, such as electrified propulsion systems, to move people and goods, while operating more quietly than traditional aircraft and with reduced aircraft emissions. In 2022, GAO reported that stakeholders said the federal government—including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT)—and industry will need to address a variety of issues before AAM operations can be widely implemented, including bringing AAM aircraft into commercial use. DOT identified a variety of legal authorities that are relevant to the future regulation of civilian AAM operations, and FAA—which is responsible for ensuring the safety and efficiency of the U.S. aerospace system—has taken actions using these authorities. These actions include publishing proposed rules, developing interim guidance, and reviewing existing policies. For example: Aircraft certification. FAA prescribes rules for aircraft certification and safety. FAA is in the process of certifying initial AAM aircraft designs using existing certification processes and rules. Pilot and mechanic training. FAA determines the knowledge, experience, and training requirements for pilots and mechanics. In a June 2023 notice of proposed rulemaking, FAA proposed temporary pilot training standards that would apply to initial groups of AAM pilots. FAA said that it would develop rules on AAM mechanic certification at a later time, if needed. Airspace management. FAA prescribes aircraft operational requirements, such as minimum flight altitudes. FAA's 2023 AAM Implementation Plan says that near-term AAM operations can be managed with existing air traffic control tools, procedures, and protocols. Vertiport construction and noise management. FAA issued interim guidance on vertiport design standards and is considering the impact of AAM operations as the agency reviews its noise policy. ​​​​​​Officials from DOT and selected tribal, state, and local government officials generally agreed that FAA has exclusive legal authority over three of these topic areas—(1) certification and safety of AAM aircraft, (2) pilot and mechanic training, and (3) airspace management. Tribal, state, and local governments have certain legal authorities related to vertiport construction and noise management. For example, tribal, state, and local governments have the authority to develop and enforce zoning regulations, which would determine where vertiports could be built and could influence how communities experience noise from AAM aircraft. According to government officials, industry stakeholders, and others we interviewed, there are certain issues to consider in the short term (present day through 2028) as the AAM industry develops, while other issues may be more relevant in the long term as AAM operations evolve (after 2028). Issues for consideration in the short term. Officials with whom we spoke noted that they are awaiting the finalization of rules or guidance from DOT on key topics. For example, some local officials said that it would be premature to discuss changes to existing requirements for AAM aircraft vertiport infrastructure until FAA completes its recommendations for the clearance needed around AAM aircraft takeoff and landing locations. Issues for consideration in the long term. In the longer term, some interviewees expressed the view that issues might arise in key areas as the industry develops and the tempo of AAM operations increase. For example, a few interviewees noted that the current approach for certifying AAM aircraft might become too time-consuming if manufacturers seek to certify numerous diverse AAM designs. In addition, some interviewees anticipated that current federal airspace management regulations will be appropriate for initial, piloted AAM operations, but as some of these aircraft are expected to be capable of autonomous flight, regulations will need to evolve to manage uncrewed, autonomous AAM aircraft. Why GAO Did This Study The Advanced Air Mobility Coordination and Leadership Act, enacted in October 2022, included a provision for GAO to conduct a study on the roles, responsibilities, and interests of federal, tribal, state, and local governments with regards to AAM. This report describes (1) the legal authorities held by DOT relevant to the future regulation of civilian AAM operations, and actions taken relevant to these authorities, (2) relevant legal authorities of selected tribal, state, and local governments, and (3) issues to consider as the AAM industry develops, as identified by selected government entities and other stakeholders. To address each objective, we focused on five key areas that we have previously found to be important to the development of AAM operations. These topic areas include: certification and safety of aircraft, pilot and mechanic training, airspace management, vertiport construction, and noise management. For more information, contact Heather Krause at 202-512-2834 or krauseh@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense's (DOD) August 2022 action plan generally captures recommendations from nine studies on civilian harm. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy—the office that led the development of the action plan and is leading its implementation—told GAO that that these studies were fundamental in developing the action plan. While there is no requirement that the action plan incorporate all of the recommendations from these studies, the action plan captures 61 of 68 recommendations from the nine studies. For example, it incorporates recommendations from two studies to develop guidance for addressing civilian harm across the full spectrum of DOD operations. The action plan does not capture seven recommendations, such as five that focused on specific military operations or DOD components. DOD has begun work on all 11 objectives of the action plan, according to Policy officials, initially focusing on implementing five (see figure). The officials stated that the five objectives are particularly critical in the implementation of the action plan. For example, the Army is leading a DOD-wide workforce study to determine the personnel needs for the implementation of the action plan. That is, the study will assess the need for 166 full-time equivalents across DOD components, as initially set forth in the action plan. DOD's Initial Focus in Implementing the Civilian Harm Action Plan However, DOD has not addressed two key challenges as it has begun to implement the action plan. First, some DOD component officials do not know what constitutes improvement. For example, officials from one component told GAO that they do not know what the end state is for the action plan. Establishing performance goals and measures could help DOD target resources and make adjustments in the remaining years of implementation, currently planned to go through 2025. Second, some DOD component officials are unclear on how the action plan is relevant to nonkinetic activities, such as space and cyber operations. A Policy official stated that figuring out the specifics of how to mitigate and respond to civilian harm in nonkinetic activities was not a priority for DOD, but this will become increasingly important. Without conducting an assessment to clarify how to mitigate and respond to civilian harm for nonkinetic activities, DOD components will not be positioned to implement the action plan for those activities. Why GAO Did This Study DOD has reported to Congress that civilian casualties are a tragic and unavoidable part of war. Nevertheless, the U.S. military is steadfastly committed to protecting civilians in military operations. As a part of the commitment to continue improving DOD's approach to civilian harm mitigation and response, in August 2022, the department issued an action plan to help improve the approach. House Report 117-397 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's processes to identify and evaluate studies on the protection of civilians in U.S. military operations. GAO examined (1) how the action plan captures the studies on civilian harm and the associated recommendations, (2) the status of the action plan's implementation, and (3) the extent to which DOD has addressed any challenges in implementing its action plan. GAO analyzed DOD and external studies on civilian harm, reviewed reports and briefings on action plan implementation, and interviewed officials from DOD components with knowledge of the development and implementation of the action plan.

What GAO Found In November 2021, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) announced Centroamérica Local (CL), an initiative to empower local organizations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to implement programs addressing root causes of migration to the U.S. GAO's review of all 18 CL grants and other awards from August 2021 through June 2023 found each included elements aligning with at least one of five pillars of the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America (Root Causes Strategy). GAO also found USAID consulted with local stakeholders, including implementing partners and mission staff, in developing CL. Stakeholders told GAO that USAID's CL project development process—“co-creation”—is more collaborative than prior localization efforts and better addresses local needs. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Application and Co-Creation Process The El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras missions assessed staffing levels and requested additional positions to support localization. However, their staffing to oversee CL and other localization efforts has gaps resulting from resource constraints, such as space limitations. For example, in Guatemala, the new embassy compound is too small to accommodate all USAID mission staff. USAID has taken short-term measures, such as allowing one mission to hire short-term contractors. However, mission officials said they will need to hire additional staff to oversee the growing number of smaller awards for CL. Identifying long-term solutions to the missions' staffing shortages would help ensure adequate oversight of CL. The El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras missions have taken steps to identify and mitigate risks, including fiduciary, programmatic, reputational, and fraud risks that could affect CL. However, the missions have not followed GAO's leading practices for assessing fraud risk. The missions considered and documented some fraud risk through annual risk management processes but have not examined program-specific fraud risks. Also, missions and implementing partners have access to fraud awareness training, but attendance is not mandated or tracked because USAID does not require it agencywide. As a result, USAID lacks assurance that its missions and partners know how to identify and mitigate key fraud risks to CL-related programs. Why GAO Did This Study Hundreds of thousands of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran nationals are encountered at the southwest U.S. land border each year. In July 2021, the White House launched the Root Causes Strategy to address economic, governance, and security factors driving migration to the U.S. from Central America. In November 2021, USAID announced CL, a 5-year, $300 million initiative. Through CL, USAID seeks to empower local organizations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to address root causes of migration by, among other things, advancing economic growth, improving governance, and strengthening security. GAO was asked to review USAID's implementation of CL. Although the initiative is too new for an evaluation of its effectiveness, this report examines, among other things, the extent to which USAID (1) integrated elements of the Root Causes Strategy and consulted local stakeholders in developing CL; (2) assessed and adjusted its staffing levels for grant management and program oversight; and (3) identified risks to CL, including fraud risks. GAO reviewed USAID documents, analyzed USAID data, and interviewed USAID officials in Central America and Washington, D.C. GAO also interviewed local stakeholders in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

What GAO Found The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA) established two new procedures—expungement and reexamination—that allow individuals and businesses to challenge a registered trademark on the basis that it was not used in commerce, as is normally required. A successful challenge results in the trademark being removed from the register, thus making it available for potential use for the challenger or other applicants. GAO found that from December 2021 through June 2023 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and attorneys representing trademark owners filed nearly 500 petitions under the new procedures. Collectively, these petitions resulted in the removal of more than 2,500 falsely claimed goods and services from the trademark register. Trademark attorneys told GAO that the new procedures can be cost-effective and low-risk. Existing USPTO programs have also addressed inaccurate or false trademark applications and registrations. The agency's post registration audit program removed trademarked goods and services in about half of its randomly selected audits each year from the start of the program in 2017. This suggests that there may be more than 1 million false and inaccurate registrations out of about 2.8 million overall due to an influx of applications, among other factors. Fraudulent Images of the Same Flashlight with Different Logos Included in Trademark Applications Submitted to USPTO The USPTO has taken steps to limit fraud risks, such as establishing a culture conducive to fraud risk management. However, the USPTO has not conducted a comprehensive fraud risk assessment of the trademark register or designed a fraud risk strategy. Implementing leading practices from GAO's Fraud Risk Framework would allow the USPTO to comprehensively consider fraud risks, establish more effective controls, and fully articulate a tolerable level of fraud risk while considering the costs and benefits of potential control activities. GAO also found that the USPTO's current data systems do not allow the agency to: (1) assess the effectiveness of current trademark fraud prevention programs and (2) implement new technologies for identifying fraud. Academics told GAO that computational tools such as predictive analytics could help the USPTO identify trademark applications with false or inaccurate information more effectively. Why GAO Did This Study Registering a trademark such as a word or symbol is often an essential part of building a business. In recent years there have been a growing number of trademark applications that include false or inaccurate images showing goods that are not actually sold or used in commerce. This has made it more difficult for businesses to find unused trademarks. The TMA includes a provision for GAO to review the USPTO's efforts to address inaccurate and false claims in trademark applications and registrations. This report examines (1) the extent to which the USPTO and third parties used the new TMA procedures; (2) other USPTO initiatives; and (3) the extent to which USPTO used fraud risk principles to address the issue. GAO analyzed USPTO trademark data related to TMA's new procedures and interviewed USPTO officials on other programs and procedures used to protect the integrity of the trademark register. GAO also evaluated the USPTO's current fraud risk practices against key elements of GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and conducted semi-structured interviews with trademark attorneys, top trademark-owning companies, academics, and trademark industry associations to obtain their views on the new procedures.

What GAO Found The U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) operating administrations enter into agreements with DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) for a variety of services, including research. DOT officials told GAO that they consider multiple factors when choosing the Volpe Center to conduct research or perform other services. These factors include: Expertise. DOT officials told GAO that they consider the Volpe Center's expertise and institutional knowledge on a topic. For example, the Federal Highway Administration has leveraged the Volpe Center's technical expertise in noise reduction and air quality to create tools for state and regional officials to demonstrate reduced congestion and improved air quality. Nature of the work. DOT officials told GAO that, because the Volpe Center is a part of the agency, certain issues (e.g., inherently governmental functions) are best addressed by Volpe Center staff. For example, Volpe Center staff have long served as the primary technical resource informing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's fuel economy standards rulemaking. Response time. DOT officials told GAO that the Volpe Center's ability to rapidly respond to agency needs is also a consideration. Volpe Center officials cited the center's recent work to help form the new Joint Office of Energy and Transportation, which involved performing technical reviews of grant applications, as an example of its ability to respond rapidly. The proportion of research funding committed to the Volpe Center compared to other entities varied across five selected DOT operating administrations in fiscal year 2022 (see figure). Combined, these operating administrations committed a total of $50.5 million—13 percent of their total fiscal year 2022 research funding—to the Volpe Center. The remaining 87 percent went to other entities such as universities, businesses, and non-profit organizations. Research Funding Committed to the Volpe Center and Other Entities by Five Department of Transportation Operating Administrations, Fiscal Year 2022 DOT operating administrations manage their respective research portfolios. According to DOT officials, each operating administration's distribution of research funding is driven by its mission and role, the scope of individual projects, and the factors described above. Why GAO Did This Study DOT's research activities are critical to its mission of making the nation's transportation system safer and more efficient. In 2020, GAO found that this research may be conducted by the agency's operating administrations, nonfederal research entities, or DOT's Volpe Center. DOT established what is now the Volpe Center in 1970. Its mission is to improve the U.S. transportation system by anticipating emerging issues and advancing technical, operational, and institutional innovations for the public good. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act includes a provision for GAO to review the surface transportation activities at the Volpe Center. This report describes (1) factors that selected DOT operating administrations consider when choosing the Volpe Center for research or other services, and (2) how much research funding selected DOT operating administrations committed to the Volpe Center compared to other entities in fiscal year 2022, among other objectives. GAO selected five DOT operating administrations for analysis that have a surface transportation-focused mission, are responsible for duties and initiatives intended to improve the safety of the traveling public, and entered into agreements with the Volpe Center in fiscal year 2022. GAO also reviewed relevant laws and DOT policies; analyzed DOT data; and interviewed officials from DOT, the Volpe Center, and the five selected operating administrations. For more information, contact Elizabeth Repko at (202) 512-2834 or repkoe@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Federal agencies are generally required to process Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests within 20 working days. However, the government-wide request backlog has risen over the last decade (see figure), demonstrating that agencies face persistent challenges processing requests within required time frames. Year-End FOIA Request Backlogs Government-wide, Fiscal Years 2013–2022 In annual reports, agency Chief FOIA Officers have cited key factors contributing to increases in their backlogs. Factors include the increasing complexity of FOIA requests, staffing challenges, and increasing litigation. Agencies also reported on actions taken to address their backlogs. For example, agencies reported using data to actively monitor the status of requests and inform actions to close them. The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Information Policy (OIP) helps agencies administer FOIA, but additional guidance and other resources could better support agency efforts to address backlogs. OIP directs agencies with significant backlogs to create backlog reduction plans. However, OIP does not specify what agencies should include in these plans so most have not included key elements. Of the 14 agencies directed to develop 2023 plans, two included goals and none included timelines for implementing actions. By providing such guidance, OIP could ensure agencies specify goals, milestones, and metrics to track progress. OIP instructs agencies to calculate the average time it takes the agency overall to process requests. However, since 2013, many agencies have reported inaccurate times in one or more years. Improvements to OIP's data checks and training could help improve the accuracy of these data. In focus groups with GAO, agency officials and nongovernmental stakeholders suggested various changes to FOIA, such as expanding the records agencies must release without a request, to help agencies address backlogs. However, there was generally little consensus on specific changes they would recommend. Why GAO Did This Study FOIA requires federal agencies to provide the public with access to government information. FOIA request backlogs hinder government transparency and prevent individuals' timely access to information. GAO was asked to review government-wide issues related to agency FOIA request backlogs. This report (1) describes factors federal agencies identified as causes of backlog increases, (2) describes methods agencies reported using to address backlogs, (3) assesses relevant government-wide guidance and resources, and (4) describes the perspectives of agency officials and nongovernmental stakeholders on proposed FOIA changes to help agencies address backlogs. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed Chief FOIA Officer reports published between 2019 and 2023 by all agencies receiving 50 or more FOIA requests each year. GAO also conducted four focus groups with FOIA officials from major federal agencies and one with nongovernmental stakeholders from academia, media, and the FOIA requester community. GAO analyzed data from FOIA.gov, reviewed government-wide FOIA guidance and resources, and interviewed agency officials.

A federal grand jury returned an indictment March 5 charging Verena May Mathis, 24, of Capitol Heights, with sexual exploitation of a child and with child sex trafficking.

What GAO Found Since Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the U.S. has provided more than $42 billion in security assistance, including defense articles, training, and services, to the government of Ukraine. U.S.-origin defense articles have been provided primarily using Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which allows the President to transfer articles and services from U.S. stocks, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which the U.S. government may use to provide articles and services to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DOD) has established new entities to deliver an unprecedented volume of defense articles to Ukraine in condensed time frames using PDA and USAI. However, DOD has not fully documented the roles and responsibilities of these new entities. Doing so would help provide clarity around the processes for quickly delivering defense articles in current and potential future conflicts. U.S.-Origin Defense Articles Loaded from Aircraft to Truck for Delivery to Ukraine DOD does not have quality data to track delivery of defense articles to Ukraine. DOD guidance on PDA does not clearly define at what point in the delivery process defense articles should be recorded as delivered or provide clear instructions for how DOD service branches are to confirm delivery. As a result, DOD officials sometimes record defense articles as delivered while they are in transit, weeks before they arrive in Ukraine. Additionally, DOD has not used its data systems to track the delivery of some defense articles provided under USAI. DOD officials use these data to ensure that defense articles have been delivered, to request funding for replacement of certain PDA articles, and as a baseline for conducting end-use monitoring. By taking steps to ensure the accuracy and completeness of its data, DOD will better ensure that it has the quality data needed to inform strategic decisions. DOD has a program to monitor the end-use of all defense articles provided to Ukraine but has had to alter some traditional end-use monitoring procedures in response to the ongoing conflict. For instance, DOD has been unable to directly observe some sensitive defense articles and has allowed Ukrainian officials to self-report the status of such articles. However, DOD has not formally assessed the effectiveness of its modified approach. By conducting such an assessment, DOD will better understand whether its adjusted monitoring approach ensures that defense articles are used for the purposes for which they were provided and will have the feedback needed to inform additional policy changes. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country on February 24, 2022. The amount and speed at which assistance has been distributed has raised questions about the need for greater efforts to monitor and ensure accountability for the defense articles provided. Senate Report 117-130 includes a provision for GAO to review the allocation and use of security assistance in Ukraine since the start of the conflict. GAO's review examines (1) processes DOD has used to provide U.S.-origin defense articles to Ukraine, (2) the extent to which DOD has tracked the delivery of defense articles to Ukraine, and (3) the extent to which DOD and the Department of State have monitored the end-use of defense articles delivered. GAO analyzed agency documentation; met with DOD and State officials in the U.S., Germany, and Poland; and assessed DOD data on defense article deliveries to Ukraine from August 2021 to October 2023.

What GAO Found AmeriCorps—also known as the Corporation for National and Community Service—administers a variety of grant programs that support service opportunities aimed at addressing community needs. The agency has taken some steps to manage fraud risks in its major grant programs. For example, as part of ongoing efforts to formalize its fraud risk management program, in September 2023 AmeriCorps developed a draft standard operating procedure that documents key roles of those leading fraud risk management activities. Nevertheless, many of the agency's efforts to manage fraud risks do not fully align with selected leading practices in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. For instance, AmeriCorps has not established a process to conduct regular fraud risk assessments in its major grant programs. The agency's current fraud risk assessment was conducted at the agency level and was not tailored to identify or address program-specific risks. The agency's programs vary in size and scope. For example, one program funded over 7,000 volunteers, while another program funded over 115,000 volunteers. The agency-level assessment may not result in the information necessary to effectively manage program-level fraud risks. Furthermore, AmeriCorps' current agency-level fraud risk assessment does not fully align with leading practices in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. Specifically: Identifying fraud risks. The fraud risk assessment did not fully identify specific risks or differences across its major grant programs—such as size and scope—that may warrant separate consideration. Assessing inherent fraud risks. AmeriCorps did not assess the likelihood or impact of the inherent fraud risks it identified. Setting risk tolerance. AmeriCorps set a fraud risk tolerance that does not align with guidance on the level of risk the agency is willing to accept. Specifically, AmeriCorps' guidance calls for a low fraud risk tolerance. However, the agency's fraud risk assessment set a higher risk tolerance, accepting more risk than called for by the agency's guidance. Considering existing controls. AmeriCorps did not fully consider the effect of existing controls because it had not assessed its inherent fraud risks. Conducting fraud risk assessments that fully align with leading practices can help ensure that AmeriCorps produces the program-level information necessary to strategically manage fraud risks across its major grant programs. AmeriCorps plans to explore and implement feasible antifraud data analytics, as called for by leading practices. However, the agency faces challenges that may hinder these efforts. For example, AmeriCorps does not collect any information on individual volunteers in certain programs, which may limit potential analytics. AmeriCorps has system modernization efforts currently underway that may improve data quality and allow for additional antifraud analytics. However, its plans do not explain whether its analysis will include the benefits and costs of collecting additional information or the anticipated benefits of its modernization efforts. Including these factors will help ensure that AmeriCorps fully explores the feasibility of antifraud data analytics in its major grant programs. Why GAO Did This Study AmeriCorps' grant programs address various community needs, including disaster relief, educational support, and environmental stewardship. In fiscal year 2023, the agency received over $900 million to fund these grant programs. However, AmeriCorps has faced financial management challenges. In fiscal year 2023, AmeriCorps' Inspector General identified improving financial management and prioritizing fraud prevention and detection as major management challenges. GAO was asked to review issues related to AmeriCorps' management of fraud risks in its grant programs. This report examines the extent to which AmeriCorps' (1) fraud risk management activities for major grant programs and (2) antifraud data analytics align with selected leading practices from GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. GAO reviewed relevant policies and documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed agency officials and compared this information with selected leading practices.

Gerardo Ignacio Castillo-Lopez, 32, of Mexico received the 42-month federal prison sentence March 7 at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Alexandria.

Management Letter: DOE-OIG-24-12

This is the Spanish language highlights associated with GAO-24-106162. Lo que encontró la GAO Las Instituciones de Servicio a Hispanos (HSI, por sus siglas en inglés), es decir, universidades con una matrícula de estudiantes universitarios de al menos el 25 por ciento de hispanos, tienen grandes necesidades de instalaciones, según la encuesta generalizable de la GAO sobre las HSI. Según la encuesta de la GAO, se estima que, en promedio, el 43 por ciento del espacio edificable de las HSI (es decir, los pies cuadrados) necesita reparaciones o reemplazo. Los atrasos en mantenimiento diferido, los daños ocasionados por desastres naturales o climáticos severos y los esfuerzos de modernización de las instalaciones impulsan las necesidades de instalaciones de las HSI. Por ejemplo, las HSI tienen un retraso en promedio en mantenimiento diferido de casi $100 millones, según la encuesta de la GAO. Además, se estima que el 77 por ciento de las HSI tienen al menos un proyecto de mantenimiento diferido que aborda una cuestión de salud o seguridad. Más aun, se estima que el 65 por ciento de las HSI han experimentado al menos un desastre natural o un evento climatológico severo en los últimos 5 años que ha dado como resultado la necesidad de reparar o reemplazar algunas instalaciones. Las HSI también informaron sobre necesidades de infraestructura digital insatisfechas relacionadas con el acceso y conectividad a Internet, la ciberseguridad, y los esfuerzos de aprendizaje híbrido, según la encuesta de la GAO. Por ejemplo, la GAO estima que, en aproximadamente un tercio de las HSI, más del 10 por ciento de los estudiantes no pueden conectarse de manera confiable a Internet fuera del campus, ya sea porque no pueden costear una conexión a Internet o porque ellos no tienen un dispositivo adecuado. La mayoría de las HSI (aproximadamente el 74 por ciento) también ha experimentado un ciberataque en los últimos 5 años. Las HSI realizaron inversiones recientes en aprendizaje híbrido como resultado de la pandemia de la COVID-19 y la financiación federal relacionada. Sin embargo, la GAO estima que el 90 por ciento de las HSI que ofrecen cursos híbridos enfrentan algún desafío para continuar impartiéndolos, según los resultados de la encuesta. Ejemplos de instalaciones e infraestructura digital en las HSI Las HSI dependieron de múltiples fuentes para financiar sus necesidades de proyectos de capital durante los últimos 5 años. Estas fuentes frecuentemente incluían subvenciones o consignaciones de capital estatal para las HSI públicas y matrículas y cuotas para las HSI privadas, según la encuesta de la GAO. La GAO estima que el 43 por ciento de las HSI estaban satisfechas con su acceso general a financiación. Sin embargo, las HSI informaron que enfrentaban desafíos comunes para conseguir financiación para proyectos de capital. Por ejemplo, según la encuesta de la GAO, se estima que el 74 por ciento de las HSI públicas consideran que la financiación estatal insuficiente es un desafío para abordar las necesidades de proyectos de capital. Además, alrededor de tres cuartas partes de las HSI privadas enfrentan desafíos debido a la diminución de los ingresos por matrículas y cuotas. El Departamento de Educación cuenta con tres programas de subvenciones para HSI eligibles. Aunque las HSI pueden utilizar estos fondos para apoyar proyectos de capital, en cambio, generalmente utilizan estos fondos de subvención para otras necesidades, como servicios estudiantiles, según los funcionarios del Departamento de Educación. Por qué llevó a cabo este estudio la GAO Las HSI desempeñan un papel destacado en el sistema de educación superior del país. Por ejemplo, 574 de las HSI inscribieron más de 2 millones de estudiantes hispanos en el año escolar de 2021 a 2022, lo que representa el 60 por ciento de todos los estudiantes hispanos que cursan estudios universitarios. Como la mayoría de las universidades, las HSI deben seguir invirtiendo en sus instalaciones e infraestructura digital para poder atender a sus estudiantes con seguridad y eficacia. Un informe de 2021 de la Cámara de Representantes incluye una disposición para que la GAO examine las necesidades de infraestructura, tanto física como digital, en las HSI. Este informe describe (1) las necesidades de instalaciones, (2) las necesidades de infraestructura digital y (3) las fuentes de financiación para los proyectos de capital de las HSI. Para realizar este trabajo, la GAO encuestó una muestra representativa de las HSI en los EE. UU. (incluido Puerto Rico) y recibió respuestas generalizables de 169 universidades. Las estimaciones de la encuesta tienen un margen de error no mayor que más o menos 8 puntos porcentuales con un nivel de confianza del 95 por ciento. La GAO también analizó los datos más recientes de las HSI sobre características institucionales y de los estudiantes universitarios (2021 a 2022), finanzas (2020 a 2021), programas de subvenciones para las HSI (2017 a 2022) y fondos de ayuda de COVID-19 (2021). La GAO también visitó 10 HSI que fueron seleccionadas para representar diferentes tamaños, sectores (público o privado sin fines de lucro) y regiones geográficas, y entrevistó a funcionarios del Departamento de Educación y organizaciones de las HSI. Además, la GAO revisó las leyes, los reglamentos, y los directrices federales relevantes. Para más información, contactar a Melissa Emrey-Arras al (617) 788-0534 o emreyarrasm@gao.gov.

HSI's C3 Child Exploitation Investigations Unit conducted Operation Renewed Hope II, from Feb. 26 through March 8, resulting in the location and positive identification of 19 previously unknown child sexual abuse victims, which includes 8 victims rescued from active abuse.