Allan Alberto Moreno Trevino, 41, of Mexico, pleaded guilty before a federal judge March 5.

What GAO Found The Federal Wage System (FWS) and General Schedule (GS) pay system cover about 192,455 federal blue-collar wage grade and 1.5 million federal white-collar GS employees as of 2023, respectively. Each pay system has its own separate laws, regulations, and policies that govern how it is to be administered. FWS employees receive an annual pay adjustment based on pay comparisons between FWS and private sector jobs in defined wage areas that require similar skills and responsibilities. Congressional actions have capped the FWS pay adjustments so they do not exceed the average GS pay adjustment since fiscal year 1979. This is due to budgetary concerns, according to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) officials. Since fiscal year 2004, congressional actions have required FWS employees to receive at least the same wage schedule adjustment in percentage terms that GS employees receive where they work. According to OPM and Department of Defense (DOD) officials, linking FWS pay adjustments to GS pay adjustments has resulted in FWS pay rates that are below or above prevailing (market) levels. Average Wage Schedule Rates Compared to Prevailing Wage Rates for Nonsupervisory Employees in Appropriated Fund (AF) Wage Areas for Fiscal Year 2023 Note: Employees in AF wage areas are generally funded from the Treasury. In some cases, data showed that the average wage rates were both above and below prevailing (or market) rates where there are multiple wage schedules associated with a single AF wage area. The process for administering the FWS includes: (1) establishing and combining wage areas, (2) conducting wage surveys, and (3) setting wage schedules. OPM defines wage areas based on geographic concentrations of FWS employees and private employment. Designated by OPM, DOD conducts annual surveys to collect data from private sector establishments within the wage areas and sets hourly pay rates for the wage schedules. Why GAO Did This Study The Prevailing Rate Systems Act of 1972 established the FWS for federal blue-collar employees who work in trade, craft, and labor. The act's underlying principles are to set pay rates for federal blue-collar workers in line with local prevailing (or market) rates and provide equal pay for substantially equal work. However, subsequent actions by Congress have limited the maximum pay adjustments granted to certain FWS employees, tying them to the average GS pay adjustment. The Joint Explanatory Statement for the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review the administration of the FWS. This report describes (1) characteristics of the FWS and GS pay systems and how they compare, and (2) the process for administering the FWS. GAO reviewed legislation; OPM regulations, memorandums, guidance, and documentation; DOD guidance, data, and documentation; and Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee reports. GAO also interviewed OPM and DOD officials and Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee members (comprised of agency and labor management representatives) who provide input to OPM on defining wage areas. DOD and OPM provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. For more information, contact Yvonne D. Jones at (202) 512-6806 or jonesy@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In all five selected states, child care officials reported using supplemental funding to make investments and program changes to address preexisting challenges facing families and child care providers. Preexisting challenges included the affordability and availability of child care for families, and financial viability and staffing for child care providers. These state officials reported making one-time investments, such as updating technology systems and creating targeted grants that could have long-term positive impacts (see figure). They also changed their Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) programs to enhance families' access to child care and improve providers' financial viability. For families, they expanded eligibility for subsidies and lowered family co-pays. For providers, they focused on payment rates, compensation, workforce development, and quality improvement. States planned to use various strategies to sustain program changes that were made using supplemental funding, such as establishing a new state trust fund or increasing state child care budgets. State officials said that their ability to secure ongoing funding would affect their ability to maintain certain program changes. Example of New York State (NYS) Child Care Grant Opportunity Notice The Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Child Care supported states' efforts to address challenges for families and providers with supplemental funding by encouraging specific uses for funds and offering technical assistance. After COVID-19 relief laws were enacted, the agency published guidance that encouraged states to make CCDF program changes. These included increasing provider payment rates based on new cost modelling and increasing family income eligibility limits. The Office of Child Care also provided technical assistance to help states explore options to enhance their CCDF programs and continues to support states' efforts to determine which of their recent program changes can be sustained beyond the expiration of the supplemental funding. For example, it has helped states develop strategic plans, facilitated opportunities for states to learn from their peers, and referred states to its technical assistance partners for specialized assistance. Why GAO Did This Study The COVID-19 pandemic caused significant disruptions to the country's child care sector, exacerbating preexisting challenges for families and providers. In response, in fiscal years 2020–2021 Congress appropriated more than $52 billion in supplemental funding to CCDF, which supports states' efforts to assist low-income working families with obtaining child care. The remaining funds must be expended by September 30, 2024. House Appropriations Committee Report No. 117-96 includes a provision for GAO to study the state use of COVID-19 relief funding for long-term strategies to improve and support the child care sector. This report examines (1) how selected states used supplemental funding to implement long-term strategies that help address preexisting challenges for families and providers, and (2) how OCC supported states' efforts to address challenges for families and providers using pandemic-related funds. GAO interviewed CCDF administrators from five states (Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Tennessee) about their experiences implementing long-term program changes with COVID-19 funds and the support they received from the Office of Child Care. GAO selected states to represent diversity in child care funding amounts and geographic region. The information from the states is not generalizable, but provides perspectives. GAO also interviewed agency officials and organizations knowledgeable of child care issues; and reviewed related reports, literature, federal laws and regulations, and Office of Child Care guidance. For more information, contact Kathy A. Larin at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The General Services Administration (GSA) may be legally responsible for the cleanup of environmental contaminants on federal properties it manages before it disposes of those properties via sale or other means. GSA annually reports its environmental liabilities across three categories: asbestos, non-asbestos (e.g., lead paint), and hazardous releases (e.g., petroleum). GSA uses a formula to estimate the costs to address asbestos and non-asbestos contamination, which together account for 95 percent of its annually reported liabilities. GSA bases its liability estimates for hazardous releases on site-specific information gathered by GSA's regional environmental managers. GSA's estimated environmental liabilities were largely stable between fiscal years 2018 and 2022, ranging from $1.8 to $2.0 billion. GSA manages asbestos and non-asbestos contamination in place—as these materials pose little health risk when not damaged or disturbed—and GSA officials said they take immediate action on hazardous releases. To manage asbestos in place, GSA policy requires buildings that could contain asbestos materials be inspected every 5 years. However, according to GSA data, approximately two-thirds of buildings (638 of 955) were out of compliance with this inspection policy. Buildings out of compliance include hundreds in which GSA has not conducted an inspection in more than a decade or does not know when the most recent inspection occurred. Buildings Out of Compliance with General Services Administration's 5-Year Asbestos Inspection Policy, as of September 2023 GSA officials provided several reasons these buildings are out of compliance with GSA's asbestos inspection policy, including funding and staffing challenges, incomplete records, and limitations with the database used to track asbestos inspections. GSA officials said they are developing a comprehensive plan for completing required inspections and considering changes to the asbestos policy to follow a more risk-based approach. These officials said they have not yet identified specifics of this plan, including timelines for completing required inspections or for modifying the policy. As a result, GSA does not have key data needed to monitor asbestos and protect health and safety. Why GAO Did This Study GSA's cleanup of environmental liabilities on federal properties represents a fiscal exposure for the federal government. The federal government's growing environmental liabilities and federal real property management are on GAO's High-Risk list, partly due to these challenges. GAO was asked to review how GSA estimates and manages its environmental liabilities. This report examines, among other objectives: (1) how GSA estimates environmental liabilities and (2) how GSA manages environmental contaminants and the extent to which GSA follows its asbestos management policy. GAO reviewed GSA's asbestos management policy, annual financial reports, cost estimation formulas, budget and expenditure information, real property data, and conducted three site visits. GAO also interviewed GSA officials, contractors, and subject matter experts.

What GAO Found The Department of Education is designing and testing a new model to estimate future costs of the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) program, which provides financial assistance to students and their parents for postsecondary education. Education aims to begin using the model with the President's fiscal year 2028 budget. Education officials said the new model is being designed to better reflect the complexity of both borrower behavior and the Direct Loan program. Decisions about data, analytical design, technology, and staffing will influence the model's long-term operation and the quality of future cost estimates. Education is required to develop cost estimates for the President's budget in accordance with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). FCRA reflects Education's borrowing from the Department of the Treasury to finance lending. GAO compared FCRA with three federal and private sector alternative approaches that could be used to develop cost estimates. These approaches were the Congressional Budget Office fair value (federal), Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Current Expected Credit Losses (private sector), and FASB fair value (private sector). These four approaches do not affect the eventual budgetary costs over time but do result in different initial cost estimates. Estimated initial costs under the non-FCRA approaches will generally be higher than what is initially estimated under FCRA due to a variety of factors, such as the addition of market risk and other risks. Regardless of the approach used, how well an agency is able to predict future cash flows is fundamental to calculating reliable cost estimates. Illustration of Overall Budgetary Cost Estimates for a Group of Direct Loans Converging over Time as Costs are Updated Note: The graphic assumes that actual cash flows will equal estimated cash flows over time. Education publishes information about the Direct Loan program's performance and risks that is generally consistent with guidance, but there are areas where the department could enhance its reporting by expanding the sensitivity analysis to cover a wider range of economic circumstances. Such information is particularly important given the size and complexity of the Direct Loan program. Why GAO Did This Study Over the last 3 decades, the Direct Loan program has grown in size and complexity, with over $1.3 trillion in outstanding loans as of September 2023. This program provides financial assistance to help students and their parents pay for postsecondary education. GAO was asked to review issues related to Education's Direct Loan program cost estimates. This report examines (1) the status of Education's planned model for estimating Direct Loan costs; (2) how certain federal and private sector estimation approaches would affect Direct Loan budgetary costs over time; and (3) the extent to which Education provides key information about the performance and risks of the Direct Loan program. GAO reviewed documentation on Education's current student loan model and plans for its new model. GAO analyzed the potential budgetary impact over time of four approaches for estimating the cost of a selected group of loans. GAO identified relevant reports, reviewed reporting guidance for federal loan programs, and interviewed officials from Education, other agency officials, and stakeholders with relevant expertise.

Why This Matters In 2022, the warehousing, manufacturing, and construction industries experienced over 700,000 nonfatal injuries and over 2,000 fatal accidents. Meanwhile, consumer demand on these industries grows, creating pressure for increased productivity. To enhance and monitor worker safety and productivity, companies have begun deploying wearable technologies, from ergonomic sensors to exoskeletons. Key Takeaways Recent innovations in sensor and networking technologies have increased the feasibility of and interest in the use of wearables in the workplace. Companies have already deployed some wearables, but there are limited published data on the efficacy of these technologies to increase safety in the workplace. Concerns about data privacy, cost, and ease of use may hinder widespread workplace adoption of wearables. The Technology What is it? Wearable technologies, or wearables, are devices worn on the body and can vary in size, shape, and function. Some employers have an increasing interest in using wearables to improve worker safety and productivity. Industrial uses fall into four general categories: (1) supporting devices physically assist workers with tasks like lifting (e.g., exoskeletons and powered gloves); (2) monitoring devices alert workers to specific changes in vital signs or the workplace environment (e.g., smart helmets); (3) training devices provide feedback on movements (e.g., ergonomic sensors) or help improve worker performance (e.g., augmented reality (AR) glasses); and (4) tracking devices observe the location of employees on a worksite (e.g., GPS trackers). See figure 1 for examples. Figure 1. Illustration of some wearable technologies of interest to modern industrial workplaces. How does it work? The way wearables work depends on the type of technology. Supporting devices like exoskeletons or powered gloves provide physicalsupport to the user’s shoulders, hands, or back during repetitive overhead work, gripping, or lifting. Most monitoring, training, and tracking technologies take advantage of innovations in networking by connecting many types of sensors to collect, exchange, and analyze data—sometimes referred to as the industrial internet of things (IIOT). Smart helmets, for example,incorporate physiological and environmental sensors and GPS trackers into protective headgear. These sensors can alert employees and workplace medical teams to accidents, such as falls, and to potential hazards, like heat and humidity. Similarly, ergonomic sensors, worn on the hip, back, or arm, can alert a user when they perform potentially unsafe movements (e.g., lifting with improper form). Through real-time alerts and movement data analytics, these sensors may help train workers and reduce injuries. How mature is it? Advancements in sensors, data analytics, and networking technologies have increased the feasibility of wearables, although their maturity varies. Several companies use exoskeletons or ergonomic sensors to some extent. Other wearables, such as smart helmets, have had pilot studies but still need further testing. Battery life and accuracy of underlying location tracking technologies pose challenges for scale-up. Recent studies have drawn limited conclusions in assessing the net effect of wearables on employee health and productivity. For example, one peer reviewed study showed that ergonomic sensors may reduce time in risky postures, but the study had limitations including a small sample size and short duration. A different review of wearables points out that the pressure of being constantly monitored can lead to increased stress in some workers and, consequently, increased probability of injury. Opportunities Improve employee safety. Wearables could reduce the risk of injuries from strenuous work or worker-equipment collisions and may improve response time to emergencies. Increase employee productivity. Some companies have used AR glasses to aid repair technicians or to reduce error rates when item picking to fill orders. Challenges Privacy. Monitoring devices can store data on employee physiology and movements, which may create privacy concerns. For example, employees surveyed as a part of a wearable pilot test cited concerns about being tracked.; Data Security. Data stored on wearables may be vulnerable to hackers because updating software can be difficult and many devices lack strong encryptions. Cost. Companies can face high up-front costs to acquire and deploy wearables. Ease of use. Employees may find some technologies cumbersome, complex, or uncomfortable to use. For example, one study cited employee concerns about the additional weight of the wearable. Policy Context and Questions The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducts and coordinates research on wearables. Officials from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) told us that the agency oversees workplace safety but does not have any specific standards related to wearables. What types of additional studies would determine whether wearables achieve benefits such as improving employee safety? What is the federal role, if any, in overseeing these technologies and their use in the workplace? What safeguards or standards, if any, could help ensure that the development and adoption of wearables achieves positive outcomes and responds to employee concerns? Selected GAO Work Workplace Safety and Health: Actions Needed to Improve Reporting of Summary Injury and Illness Data, GAO-21-122. Internet of Things: Status and implications of an increasingly connected world, GAO-17-75. Selected References "Wearable Technologies" NIOSH Science Blog, https://blogs.cdc.gov/niosh-science-blog/category/wearable-technologies/. Accessed January 29, 2024. Ekaterina Svertoka, et al., “Wearables for Industrial Work Safety: A Survey,” Sensors,vol. 21 (2021) doi:10.3390/s21113844. For more information, contact Karen L. Howard, PhD at (202) 512-6888 or howardk@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Since 2019, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict's (ASD-SO/LIC) oversight responsibilities for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). DOD has also increased resources for the Secretariat for Special Operations, which assists the ASD-SO/LIC in conducting oversight. However, as of September 2023, the Secretariat's staffing levels remained below the 80–94 full-time equivalent levels the Secretariat identified as required to oversee SOCOM. Comparison of Secretariat Staffing Levels with Required Levels, as of September 2023 Note: Per the 2022 staffing assessment, the expanded requirement includes a 20-percent adjustment for unanticipated workload and staff availability (e.g., leave and training) for some functions. In November 2023, the Secretariat finalized a staffing plan required by statute, including milestones to reach 69 full-time equivalents by early 2024. However, the finalized plan does not fully incorporate some key principles for strategic workforce planning, such as aligning with long-term goals, identifying critical skill gaps, and developing strategies to address them. Developing a staffing plan that incorporates these principles would help ensure that the Secretariat hires the personnel required to meet its future needs for overseeing SOCOM. Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 strengthened the ASD-SO/LIC's service secretary-like role for overseeing SOCOM's activities. The Secretariat developed 57 benchmarks for implementing section 922 and reported completing 49 of them as of January 2023. However, according to officials, the respective work process policies for the Secretariat and SOCOM are not always documented for two reasons. First DOD's Office of the Director of Administration and Management has concerns about ASD-SO/LIC's authority to issue guidance. However, the ASD-SO/LIC has broad statutory and regulatory authority under its charter to establish DOD-wide policy. Second, the Secretariat does not have a systematic approach for identifying and documenting its oversight policies. Implementing a systematic approach for documenting policies would help ensure consistent oversight. The Secretariat has at times had limited input into how its hiring, office space, and IT needs are met because of confusion about ASD-SO/LIC's administrative role, given ASD-SO/LIC's unique position within DOD. Until the ASD-SOLIC and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy clarify that administrative role, the Secretariat will continue to have limited input into its administrative services—affecting its ability to effectively oversee SOCOM. Why GAO Did This Study Congress established the ASD-SO/LIC in 1986 to oversee SOCOM's special operations activities. Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 strengthened the ASD-SO/LIC's service secretary-like role in overseeing SOCOM's activities, such as budgeting and programming. Senate Report 117-130 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's implementation of section 922. GAO examined the extent to which the Secretariat for Special Operations has (1) hired the staff needed to oversee SOCOM, (2) reported on its implementation of section 922 reforms and documented its oversight policies, and (3) faced challenges related to obtaining administrative support services. GAO analyzed fiscal years 2019–2023 Secretariat staffing levels. GAO also compared the Secretariat's staffing plan with strategic workforce planning principles, and ASD-SO/LIC's policies and practices with leading principles for interagency collaboration.

According to court documents, from December 2022 through Jan. 25, 2023, Marrero Casanova used a cellphone and instant messaging services to persuade, induce, entice and coerce two 15-year-old boys to engage in sexual activity so he could produce a visual depiction of it.

On Aug. 2, 2023, HSI agents notified the Navajo County Sheriff’s Office Major Crimes Apprehension Team that they had discovered Joshuah Cruz Eberhart, 25, of Clay Springs, was distributing child sex abuse material online.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted 55 percent of its agency comments and almost 70 percent of its sensitivity reviews to GAO after the deadline. DOD conducted two security reviews, and both were submitted late. In comparing the results of GAO's analysis of DOD's performance during this period of review with those in the first semiannual report on this topic, DOD was less timely in providing both agency comments and sensitivity/security reviews. GAO provides audited agencies with an opportunity to review and comment on draft reports before GAO issues the final report. Additionally, for any reports that may contain controlled unclassified or classified information, GAO requests that the department complete a review for such information and communicate the results of the review in writing. DOD provided GAO comments on 76 reports from May 16, 2023, to November 11, 2023. While GAO generally provides DOD with 30 days for agency comment, DOD took 35 days, on average. Of the 76 reports, DOD submitted comments for 42 after the 30-day deadline and took an additional 16 days, on average, to submit agency comments on those reports. For one report, DOD took 98 days to provide its comments. DOD completed 28 reviews—26 sensitivity and 2 security reviews—during the same period. Sensitivity reviews are conducted to identify sensitive information, such as controlled unclassified information. Reviews for classified information, such as information designated as Secret or Top Secret, are generally referred to as security reviews. On average, DOD completed sensitivity reviews in 40 days and security reviews in 77 days—exceeding the 30-day deadline. Of the 34 reports for which GAO granted an extension to the deadline for submitting comments or reviews, DOD did not meet the extension for ten. DOD also submitted comments late for eight additional reports without requesting extensions. Why GAO Did This Study Delays in DOD submitting agency comments or the sensitivity/security reviews result in GAO issuing products later than mandated or requested by Congress. In some cases, delays may result in GAO taking the unusual step of issuing reports without DOD comments in order to provide Congress with requested information. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 included a provision for GAO to report every 6 months over a 2-year period on the extent to which DOD submitted agency comments and sensitivity or security reviews in a timely manner and in accordance with GAO protocols. This report is the second in a series of four reports on this topic. For more information, contact Alissa Czyz at (202) 512-3058 or czyzA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has long invested in biomedical research. Within HHS, among others, the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) fund or conduct biomedical research. Each of these four HHS agencies' research activities have the potential for duplication when funding research in common areas. GAO found the four selected HHS agencies use multiple practices intended to help avoid unnecessary research duplication. These include reviewing project and funding information provided by applicants, consulting with experts and other agencies, and using databases to identify potentially overlapping research (see figure). When evaluating instances of research duplication, agency staff also distinguish between necessary and unnecessary duplication. GAO previously reported that some research duplication is necessary to confirm results or otherwise advance a project or field, whereas unnecessary duplication is research not needed to replicate or complement prior results. Example of HHS Agencies' Practices to Avoid Unnecessary Research Duplication In 2022, Congress directed the ARPA-H Director to, among other things, coordinate with other federal departments and agencies to ensure that ARPA-H's research is free of unnecessary duplication and established the ARPA-H Interagency Advisory Committee of eight federal agencies to coordinate efforts, among other functions. Such coordination can be a means for ARPA-H and committee member agencies to share information on their research activities and help ARPA-H avoid unnecessary duplication. ARPA-H officials told GAO that the committee will serve as a forum to identify and address potential research duplication between ARPA-H and these agencies. However, the Committee's draft charter does not mention how the members would collaborate to help ARPA-H identify and avoid funding research duplication. Leading practices for interagency collaboration include identifying shared goals and having documented agreements regarding the collaboration. By finalizing the charter to include members' agreement on collaboration methods to avoid ARPA-H funding unnecessary duplication, ARPA-H will be better positioned to improve the future return on the nation's investment in transformational health research. Why GAO Did This Study HHS's mission is to enhance the health and well-being of all Americans by, among other things, fostering sound, sustained advances in the sciences. HHS's longstanding agencies—NIH, BARDA, FDA—as well as its newest agency, ARPA-H, fund biomedical research. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to issue a series of reports on potential duplication in HHS's biomedical research and development portfolio. To manage the scope and reporting timeline, this first report focuses on ARPA-H, BARDA, FDA, and NIH as specified in the Act. It (1) describes practices used by the selected HHS agencies to identify and avoid unnecessary research duplication and (2) examines ARPA-H's collaboration and efforts to establish an interagency advisory committee as a potential means to prevent unnecessary research duplication. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed agency information, and legislation, among other documents. GAO also interviewed agency officials and a non-generalizable selection of non-federal experts in biomedical research.

What GAO Found Starting in fiscal year 2020, DOD developed and phased in procedures to vet international military students attending training at Department of Defense (DOD) installations and facilities in the U.S. With few exceptions, DOD vets these students prior to travel to the U.S. for training and periodically during the students' stay. According to training management system data, from October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023, DOD vetted over 29,000 cases, including students and any accompanying family members. DOD identified findings in 103 cases: four were classified as “high” risk, 18 were “moderate”, and 81 were “low.” DOD denied access to nine students for various security-related reasons. International Military Student Cases by Risk Level and Adjudication Result for October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023 Risk level Cases Approved for training Denied Pending Adjudication not performeda High risk 4 0 4 0 0 Moderate risk 18 7 3 4 4 Low risk 81 47 2 14 18 No findings 29,202 29,202 0 0 0 Total 29,305 29,256 9 18 22 Source: GAO analysis of data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. | GAO-24-106421 Note: Vetting of international military students began with basic screening in December 2019 and DOD continued to phase in initial security vetting through March 2022. aDepartment of Defense (DOD) officials stated they did not adjudicate 22 of the moderate and low risk cases for reasons such as training cancellation or the student completed training during the establishment of vetting procedures and has since departed the U.S. DOD has taken some steps to improve implementation of vetting procedures for international military students. However, DOD has not assessed implementation to identify opportunities for improvement. For example, stakeholders told GAO of factors in vetting implementation that could be improved, such as limitations with in-country data collection and a time-consuming process for sharing information between stakeholders. DOD circulated a draft progress report on program metrics, such as the number of students who underwent vetting for fiscal year 2022. However, DOD has not finalized the report, and it is unclear if it will include an assessment of any opportunities for improvement in the vetting procedures. Without an assessment, DOD will not have a full understanding of factors that hinder vetting implementation. DOD also cannot determine whether or how it should take action to improve vetting implementation. The Department of State and DOD share information to support international military student vetting in a variety of ways, such as sharing database access and confirming vetting. However, State and DOD have not ensured that roles and responsibilities are fully clarified in guidance or written agreements. If DOD and State take actions to clarify roles and responsibilities for sharing information on issues related to international military students, the agencies can better coordinate on program management, including communicating relevant policy updates and sharing additional data and analysis regarding vetting. Why GAO Did This Study DOD provides education and training to foreign military personnel at DOD sites. On December 6, 2019, an international military student killed three U.S. service members and injured eight others while attending training at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. The attack raised questions about personnel safety at DOD sites hosting students for training. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's implementation of security vetting for international military students and accompanying family members. GAO's report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD has developed vetting procedures for international military students and addressed any implementation challenges; and (2) State and DOD have shared information related to students' training at DOD sites in the U.S. GAO reviewed documentation; analyzed vetting result data for October 1, 2019, through March 31, 2023; and interviewed DOD and State officials and stakeholders from six unified combatant commands and three U.S. embassies.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) bases its approach for suicide prevention on its 2018 National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide. This strategy outlines a comprehensive public health approach to suicide prevention that includes a combination of (1) clinically-based interventions, such as suicide risk screening for individual patients, and (2) community-based programs and services, such as programs to promote firearm safety to the public to reduce the risk of suicide by firearms. In 2017, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) organizationally combined the Office of Suicide Prevention and the Veterans Crisis Line——which GAO refers to collectively as suicide prevention programs—with mental health policy and operations in its newly created Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention (OMHSP). VHA stated that it created OMHSP to ensure oversight and management of evidence-based strategies within VHA and the community related to identifying veterans with mental health care needs, identifying veterans in crisis, and decreasing the rate of veteran suicide. OMHSP leadership officials identified benefits and challenges related to the placement of suicide prevention programs within OMHSP. For example, OMHSP's leadership officials reported that including suicide prevention and mental health within the same office facilitated internal coordination, which was beneficial when implementing new legislation that targeted suicide prevention and mental health issues. However, Suicide Prevention Branch officials reported challenges related to the office's public health suicide prevention efforts. For example, officials said their placement within OMHSP has given them less autonomy with decision-making, such as decisions about suicide prevention initiatives, which require multiple levels of approval. In July 2023, VHA approved a number of changes to its organizational structure that include moving both the Suicide Prevention Program and Veterans Crisis Line out of OMHSP into a separate program office within VHA's Office for Clinical Services. VHA conducted an assessment to determine the best placement for these programs. VHA's assessment and officials GAO spoke with identified several benefits and challenges related to this organizational change. The benefits included the importance of having the Suicide Prevention Office in a more elevated position within Clinical Services given its priority within the department and its need to coordinate across multiple VHA offices. The challenges included that keeping suicide prevention within the Office for Clinical Services could give the impression that suicide prevention is solely a clinical issue. VHA documents indicate that it plans to implement this change in 2024. As VHA implements these organizational changes, it will be important for it to determine whether this structure achieves the benefits it has anticipated and addresses anticipated, as well as any unanticipated, challenges or risks. Why GAO Did This Study Suicide is a persistent public health problem facing all populations, but particularly veterans. Veterans suffer a disproportionately higher rate of suicide compared to non-veterans. An average of almost 18 veterans died by suicide each day in 2021—a rate about 72 percent higher than the general adult population. VA reported that about 62 percent of the veterans who died by suicide in 2021 had not obtained recent health care through VHA. VHA works to build networks of support, communication, and health care across communities in which veterans live and work to help prevent deaths by suicide of veterans who do not obtain care through VA' health system. Suicide prevention is VA's stated top clinical priority. VHA's suicide prevention programs have the lead responsibility for overseeing and implementing the department's suicide prevention initiatives. Among its responsibilities, the Suicide Prevention Program helps implement VA's National Strategy. VHA's Crisis Hotline is a national toll-free number that supports veterans in emotional crisis. Since establishing these programs in 2007, VHA has moved their organizational placement within various program offices at its national headquarters, also referred to as the central office, multiple times. In May 2017, both suicide prevention programs were placed alongside VHA's mental health programs within the newly established OMHSP. However, in July 2023, VHA approved a number of changes to its organizational structure, including changes to the placement of these suicide prevention programs. GAO conducted its review of VA's management of its mental health and suicide prevention services, including OMHSP's organizational structure, pursuant to law. This report answers key questions related to the organization of OMHSP and its suicide prevention programs. For more information, contact Alyssa M. Hundrup at (202) 512-7114 or hundrupa@gao.gov.

What GAO Found This report provides an unclassified summary of GAO's classified briefing to the House of Representatives' Committee on Armed Services. In 2021, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) developed a 10-year research program plan to study plutonium and pit aging. According to NNSA officials, the results from the research plan will allow NNSA to more confidently predict pit lifetimes for each nuclear weapon system in the U.S. stockpile. To do so, NNSA requires the use of experimental facilities across the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA will also need to expand its inventory of samples of artificially aged plutonium so that aging effects can be projected decades into the future. NNSA's estimated budgetary requirements to carry out the planned experiments, modeling, and simulation activities total about $1 billion over the 10-year period of fiscal years 2021 through 2030. Why GAO Did This Study NNSA is responsible for ensuring the stockpile's performance, safety, and reliability. Scientists and other weapons experts have identified concerns that radioactive decay of plutonium in a pit, called aging, over many years may degrade a weapon's performance. Prior to 2021, independent evaluations indicated that NNSA was not sufficiently prioritizing plutonium and pit aging research. The results of this research are needed to inform decisions about stockpile management and modernization. For more information, contact Allison Bawden at (202) 512-3841 or bawdena@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) conducted sustainment reviews for 25 weapon systems for fiscal year 2022, including developing operating and support (O&S) cost estimates for the remainder of each system's life cycle. O&S costs are comprised of costs for repair parts, maintenance activities, contract services, and personnel. DOD assessed O&S cost growth for 16 systems but was unable to make cost growth determinations for the nine remaining systems, due to a lack of available information to conduct the comparison (see first figure). DOD identified critical cost growth for seven of the 16 systems and the reasons for that growth (see second figure). A statute defines critical O&S cost growth as at least 25 percent more than the estimate documented in the most recent independent cost estimate; or at least 50 percent more than the estimate documented in the original baseline cost estimate for the system. The other nine systems experienced O&S cost changes, but any growth identified did not meet the critical O&S cost growth criteria. Number of Weapon Systems Reviewed and Operating and Support (O&S) Cost Growth Identified by the Department of Defense (DOD) in Fiscal Year 2022 Causes of Critical Operating and Support (O&S) Cost Growth in Seven Systems DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation updated its guidance based on lessons learned from the most recent sustainment reviews. However, military departments vary in how they report the details of cost estimates. For example, they presented cost information differently in several areas, including the time frames for the estimate, the breakdown of information across cost categories, and the effects of inflation. Without the development and implementation of clear guidance on the presentation of such information, DOD stakeholders and Congress will not have consistent and complete information for effective decision making and oversight. Why GAO Did This Study DOD spends billions of dollars to sustain its weapon systems. O&S costs are about 70 percent of a system's total life-cycle cost. In response to a statutory provision, DOD is required to annually submit sustainment reviews that include O&S cost estimates and the reasons for any critical cost growth. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's annual sustainment reviews and O&S cost estimates through 2025. GAO's report evaluates the extent to which DOD (1) developed sustainment reviews for fiscal year 2022 that identified critical O&S cost growth and related causes; and (2) identified and implemented any lessons learned for critical O&S cost growth from conducting the reviews. GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD guidance and documentation, the submitted fiscal year 2022 reviews, and the supporting independent cost estimates. GAO interviewed DOD officials who conducted the reviews. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO is issuing concurrently. GAO omitted information that DOD deemed sensitive.

What GAO Found Limited information is available on the prevalence of evictions nationally. Local courts generally administer evictions, a process that generally begins with a property owner giving tenants a notice and then filing a lawsuit that may end with a judgement for or against the tenant. Tenants also may be forced to vacate a residence through an informal eviction, which occurs outside the legal process, such as when a property owner changes the locks. The most recent national eviction estimates are based primarily on two sources: Eviction court records. The Eviction Lab at Princeton University estimated 7.8 evictions were filed per 100 renting households nationally in 2018. This estimate was based on available court record data and statistical modeling. American Housing Survey. In 2017, the Census Bureau included survey questions designed to count forced moves due to evictions. Researchers estimated a national physical eviction rate of 5.3 percent based on the results of these questions. However, HUD officials and researchers noted the survey's small sample size may limit the accuracy of these estimates. Court record and survey data, which capture different aspects of evictions, both present challenges for collecting eviction data. Court record data capture whether an eviction has been filed in court, but they do not capture physical or informal evictions. Court records may vary in content and their availability to the public. Eviction case data also may not include the outcome of a filing, making it difficult to determine if a filing resulted in an eviction judgement. Surveys may capture physical moves by tenants, but may undercount evictions if the questions are not designed properly or response rates are low. Stakeholders GAO interviewed representing state and local jurisdictions, research organizations, and housing organizations identified two options to improve the collection of eviction data: (1) developing a national database of court record data or (2) strengthening national surveys. These stakeholders also identified several considerations for either option. GAO previously identified key practices applicable to such efforts. Examples of considerations and key practices include the following: Goals. Stakeholders stated that clearly defined goals could help plan collection efforts. Potential goals for using the data include helping target or assess federal efforts, such as those designed to reduce eviction and housing instability. The two options may have benefits and limitations in achieving different goals. Data quality. To ensure the reliability of evidence, stakeholders stressed the importance of establishing clear definitions and standards for terminology, given the differing definitions of eviction used across the country. Otherwise, both potential options run the risk of collecting incomplete or unreliable data, which could produce misleading results. Resources. Both options to improve collection of eviction data could involve substantial costs. Stakeholders noted that federal technical assistance and training for local court staff could help build capacity for data collection. Strengthening surveys could be the less costly option but would require additional resources to ensure they generated reliable results. Why GAO Did This Study Estimates suggest that eviction affects millions of renter households annually. Evictions can have consequences for a family's mental health and housing stability, be expensive for the parties involved, and increase court caseloads. Comprehensive eviction data collection could have potential benefits for evaluating the effectiveness of policy interventions or remedies. However, relatively little comprehensive data exist on evictions in the U.S. The Explanatory Statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review any barriers to collecting, digitizing, and standardizing data from the eviction process. This report (1) describes existing information about evictions and its limitations, (2) examines the capabilities and constraints of using court data and surveys on evictions, and (3) examines potential goals and options for federal data collection on evictions. GAO conducted a literature review on efforts to collect and improve eviction data. GAO also reviewed data, documentation, and studies from federal and academic sources. GAO interviewed 22 stakeholders, including officials from a nongeneralizable sample of eight state and local jurisdictions (selected to obtain a mix of characteristics such as renter population and geographic dispersion), federal agency officials, researchers, and representatives from housing organizations. For more information, contact Jill Naamane at (202) 512-8678 or naamanej@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Justice40 Initiative's goal is for 40 percent of the overall benefits of certain federal investments to flow to disadvantaged communities that have been historically marginalized and overburdened. To develop guidance and tools for implementing the initiative, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) took steps to collaborate with federal and nonfederal entities. EOP worked with the White House Environmental Justice Interagency Council, an advisory council, 21 Justice40 pilot programs at nine agencies, and others to develop interim guidance, a tool to identify disadvantaged communities, and a scorecard to track progress. EOP's efforts partially reflected leading practices for collaboration. For example, EOP included relevant entities in its collaboration efforts but has not clarified the roles and responsibilities of the Interagency Council. Seven Investment Areas of the Justice40 Initiative Additionally, over half of the Justice40 pilot programs that GAO surveyed answered that the guidance and tools in place at the time were useful. However, some programs faced challenges, such as unclear guidance. According to GAO's analysis, EOP did not systematically gather feedback on programs' experience with the guidance and tools. By more fully incorporating leading practices for collaboration, such as by systematically gathering feedback and clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Interagency Council, EOP can better ensure that its guidance and tools provide an effective, timely, and consistent framework for Justice40 implementation. EOP took initial steps to collect some data on agencies' Justice40 actions and published the first annual scorecard. However, EOP has not established a process for assessing implementation of the Justice40 Initiative. By incorporating key practices for effectively managing and assessing the results of federal efforts as it establishes such a process, EOP can better ensure accountability, transparency, and progress toward achieving the goal of the initiative. Why GAO Did This Study In February 2021, Executive Order 14008 directed federal agencies to take action to address the disproportionately high and adverse human health, environmental, climate-related, and other cumulative impacts on disadvantaged communities. As part of this effort, the executive order established the Justice40 Initiative. The initiative is led by EOP, specifically the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Office of Management and Budget, and Climate Policy Office. It currently covers more than 500 federal programs at 19 agencies, which involve billions of taxpayer dollars. GAO was asked to review implementation of the Justice40 Initiative. This report examines the extent to which (1) EOP collaborated with federal and nonfederal entities to develop guidance and tools for implementing the initiative; (2) pilot programs found EOP's guidance and tools useful; and (3) EOP established a process for assessing federal efforts to achieve the goal of the initiative. GAO reviewed executive orders and EOP documents; interviewed EOP staff, agency officials, and nonfederal entities; analyzed survey responses from 20 of 21 Justice40 pilot programs; and compared EOP efforts with leading practices.

What GAO Found Domestic violent extremists use social media and gaming platforms for several purposes, including to reach wide audiences; to insert their extremist ideas into the mainstream; and to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize others, according to government reports and experts GAO spoke with (see figure). Experts noted that violent extremists generally use a variety of platforms for different purposes, depending on available features, audiences, and content moderation practices. Example of the Viral Nature of Domestic Violent Extremists' Use of Online Platforms According to social media and gaming companies GAO met with, they use various content moderation tools to identify and remove content they determine violates their platforms' policies related to domestic violent extremism on their platforms. For example, they report using machine learning tools to scan for content that violates their policies, as well as reviews by employees. However, companies and experts reported that several factors affect these moderation efforts, such as company financial considerations and diversity in standards of acceptable content. For example, content banned on one platform could be allowed on another. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have mechanisms to share and receive domestic violent extremism threat-related information with social media and gaming companies. However, neither agency has developed a strategy that articulates how it identifies and selects companies to engage with or the goals and desired outcomes of those engagements. Without a strategy or goals, the agencies may not be fully aware of how effective their communications are with companies, or how effectively their information-sharing mechanisms serve the agencies' overall missions. Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, content on social media and gaming platforms that promotes domestic violent extremism has influenced several high-profile attacks, according to experts and agency officials. As a result, some social media and gaming companies, as well as federal agencies, are making an effort to understand and address online content that promotes domestic violent extremism. GAO was asked to review domestic violent extremists' use of social media and gaming platforms. This report (1) describes the purposes for which domestic violent extremists use these platforms; (2) describes how selected companies report mitigating content promoting domestic violent extremism; and (3) assesses the extent to which the FBI and DHS have developed goals and strategies for sharing threat-related information with companies. GAO reviewed FBI and DHS documentation and interviewed officials. GAO obtained views from 16 subject matter experts identified by the National Academies of Sciences and prior work. GAO also interviewed representatives from a non-generalizable sample of five social media and gaming companies.

What GAO Found The National Institutes of Health (NIH), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), plays a key role in supporting the coordination of autism activities across 18 federal agencies, including the Departments of Defense and Education. For example, NIH manages the Interagency Autism Coordination Committee (IACC), a federal advisory committee composed of federal agencies and public members, through its Office of National Autism Coordination. GAO found that NIH, in support of the IACC and the National Autism Coordinator, generally followed six of eight key collaboration practices that GAO's prior work has shown can be effective in enhancing and sustaining interagency collaborative efforts among federal entities. For example, NIH has taken steps to bridge organizational cultures by convening meetings of the IACC. Assessment of the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) Role in Supporting Coordination of Federal Autism Activities Compared with Leading Practices for Interagency Coordination GAO found NIH efforts to support interagency coordination partially followed the remaining two collaboration practices, including ensuring accountability. For example, although IACC strategic plans describe high-level progress made toward autism activities, they generally have not described how progress made relates to goals. NIH officials stated their progress tracking approach is driven by established processes, some of which are required by law. Establishing a clear process for tracking progress would help to determine progress toward IACC's goals and that interagency efforts are effective. NIH helps ensure federally funded autism activities are not unnecessarily duplicative through various activities, such as holding meetings and through data and information reviews. However, GAO found the processes used by NIH's Office of National Autism Coordination were not documented. For example, NIH does not have written procedures describing the steps these staff should follow when reviewing federal autism research information for potential duplication. Although NIH officials stated that they believe current monitoring processes are sufficient, documenting these procedures will help ensure they are properly designed and executed to provide reasonable assurance that duplication is not occurring. Why GAO Did This Study The federal government plays an important role supporting research, programs, and other activities to promote the health and well-being of people with autism. Multiple federal agencies are involved in autism activities. To help coordinate and monitor federal autism activities and to ensure activities are not unnecessarily duplicative, Congress directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish the IACC and designate an official to facilitate coordination and implementation of autism activities, known as the National Autism Coordinator. GAO was asked to examine coordination and monitoring of federal autism activities. This report examines NIH efforts to (1) help coordinate federal autism activities and (2) monitor autism activities to ensure federal autism activities are not unnecessarily duplicative. GAO reviewed NIH documents and relevant federal laws; assessed NIH's role in supporting coordination of autism activities against key practices that GAO identified in prior work; and gathered information from 19 federal agencies that conduct autism activities.

What GAO Found The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operate five distinct trusted traveler programs—(1) TSA PreCheck® and CBP's (2) Global Entry, (3) NEXUS, (4) Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), and (5) Free and Secure Trade (FAST). These programs allow for expedited screening or inspection of preapproved, low-risk travelers at certain domestic and international airports and at select land and sea ports of entry. TSA and CBP have enrolled millions of travelers to these programs through a multi-step process that generally includes an online application, traveler vetting, and an enrollment eligibility decision. In fiscal year 2020 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2023, TSA enrolled or renewed TSA PreCheck® memberships for over 99 percent of applications, and CBP enrolled or renewed membership for over 97 percent of applications across its four programs. NEXUS Lane at the U.S. Port of Entry in Blaine, Washington TSA and CBP have reconsideration processes for travelers denied or revoked from a trusted traveler program. TSA informs travelers of its decision in a letter that includes steps for pursuing reconsideration—known as a “correction of record”—if travelers believe TSA based its decision on incorrect or incomplete information. CBP also informs travelers of its decision via a letter that includes steps for pursuing reconsideration. The CBP Ombudsman has sole discretion to sustain or overturn denial or revocation decisions, based on the totality of circumstances and any new information that the traveler has provided. While CBP notifies travelers of denial and revocation decisions through letters posted to its online portal, it does not include instructions—required by regulation—for seeking additional information on the reason for its denial decision. According to CBP officials, the agency changed the format of its letters in 2018 when it updated its online portal and inadvertently removed these instructions. By providing these instructions, CBP could improve travelers' understanding of the specific reason for the decision, as appropriate, and could better ensure that travelers are able to directly address the reason for their denial or revocation when pursuing reconsideration. Why GAO Did This Study The summer of 2023 marked one of the busiest travel seasons on record. According to Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) data, each day approximately 2.5 million passengers boarded a commercial flight, and approximately 1.1 million travelers entered the U.S. through a port of entry during that period. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the DHS trusted traveler programs and reconsideration process. This report addresses (1) DHS's trusted traveler programs and enrollments and (2) the extent to which DHS provides reconsideration for travelers it denied or revoked from its programs. GAO analyzed relevant regulations, policies, and program data from fiscal year 2020 through the second quarter of 2023; interviewed headquarters and field officials involved in the trusted traveler programs; and conducted in-person and virtual site visits to CBP enrollment centers that processed the highest volume of program applications in fiscal year 2022. While not generalizable, these visits provided program insights.